American involvement in the 2013–2014 Ukrainian Revolution

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U.S. Senator John McCain takes pictures of the crowd on Nezalezhnosti Square from his hotel window, December 14, 2013

Since the beginning of the months-long protests on Kyiv's Maidan, sparked by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union, the U.S. administration worked actively to resolve the crisis.[1] Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry took the lead, although President Barack Obama did not publicly express interest in events in the former Soviet republic.[1] The question of the role and extent of the U.S. administration's involvement in the revolution causes polarized assessments among academic researchers and political commentators: while some say Washington's involvement in the overthrow of Yanukovych is a fact,[2][3][4][5] others attribute this thesis to Russian propaganda or regard it as a conspiracy theory.[6][7]

Geopolitical context[edit]

In the estimation of former ambassador to Moscow William J. Burns, the Eurasian Economic Union would be incomplete without Ukraine, and the Russian leader viewed the former Soviet republic's Western orientation as an "existential problem."[8] British researcher Adam Tooze wrote that the terms offered by Russia were much less onerous for Ukraine than those put forward by the European Union.[9]

Despite the fact that the U.S. is not geographically connected to the countries located between the EU and Russia, it has long sought to strengthen its influence there.[fact or opinion?][10] At the same time, the EU and the U.S. have overlapping interests with regard to former socialist countries, which is reflected in the avoidance of Moscow's reintegration policy, while Russia's emergence as a leader in Eurasia could have geopolitical consequences that would threaten Washington's interests.[10] Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. bipartisan consensus has been to support Ukraine's transatlantic integration and the development of democracy and a market economy in the country.[11][12] The United States has tried to bring Ukraine closer to the West[neutrality is disputed] by strengthening its ties with NATO and supporting Kyiv's association with the European Union under the Eastern Partnership.[13] Thus, the United States is interested in weakening the Kremlin's political, economic, and cultural influence in Eastern Europe, while maintaining its leadership role in the region is a matter of Russia's survival as a great power.[neutrality is disputed][10] Former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma wrote that for Moscow, "The loss of former influence, particularly in the borders of the former Soviet Union is a catastrophe" and "life and-death matter."[10]

Two months before the scheduled Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, Carl Gershman, who has directed the National Endowment for Democracy since 1984, called the struggle between Russia and the European Union over post-Communist states[neutrality is disputed] "a replay of the classic East-West rivalry of the Cold War".[14] Gershman named Ukraine "the biggest prize" and called for engagement with the country's government and civil society, expressing hope that Kyiv's signing of an association agreement with the European Union "will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism."[14]

American historian Daniel Yergin suggested that the conflict between Washington and Moscow over Ukraine[neutrality is disputed] started because of the asylum granted in Russia to US intelligence whistleblower Edward Snowden, who arrived in Russia from Hong Kong in June 2013.[15] The Snowden incident led to the cancellation of a bilateral meeting between Obama and Putin in Moscow scheduled for September, the first time in decades that a U.S. president has rescinded an invitation to another country.[16]

Course of events[edit]

December 2013[edit]

The U.S. administration's initial public response to the Maidan protests was cautious:[13] while Washington made clear that it was disappointed with Yanukovych's decision to refuse to sign the association agreement, State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said that the U.S. "always treads carefully on important issues that are ongoing and sensitive and complicated".[17] The Americans called for the confrontation to be resolved peacefully, outlining their main goal: the USA wants Ukrainians to choose their own future, but this future should be in Europe.[fact or opinion?][17] In early December 2013, Elliott Abrams, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, criticized what he saw as an insufficiently active response by President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry to the meetings in Kyiv and spoke of the need "to offer at least moral support" to the protesters.[17] On December 5, speaking at the plenary session of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Kyiv, Victoria Nuland said that "There should be no doubt about where the United States stands<...>We stand with the people of Ukraine who see their future in Europe and want to bring their country back to economic health and unity."[18]

On December 10, Victoria Nuland arrived in Kyiv on a new visit and met with opposition leaders Vitali Klitschko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleh Tyahnybok.[19] On the same day, law enforcement forces tried to force the protesters out of Maidan, causing John Kerry to express his "disgust" at the actions of law enforcement agencies.[20] The U.S. diplomat's statement was a sign that Washington was becoming more active in responding to the crisis,[attribution needed] and the protests in the Ukrainian capital were becoming more violent.[21] For the Obama administration, the use of force against the demonstrators moved the situation from a matter of political preference to a field of repression against what they called peaceful protesters, a fundamental factor for U.S. diplomacy.[21] At the same time, protesters used hoses to pour ice water on police,[22] and Ukrainian Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko said that police intended to open streets near the Maidan and did not aim to completely disperse the demonstrators.[23] The U.S. administration saw Yanukovych as responsible for the tensions because of his failure to peacefully resolve the political conflict in the country.[21] White House press secretary Jen Psaki said at a briefing that Washington was considering sanctions against the Ukrainian officials.[24] Also, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel held talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Pavlo Lebedyev and said that the dispersal of protests by the army was unacceptable.[23]

On 11 December, Victoria Nuland together with US ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey R. Pyatt came to Maidan to distribute food to protesters and police officers.[22] On the same day, she held talks with Yanukovych, during which she said that the crackdown on protesters was unacceptable.[22] According to investigative journalist Serhiy Leshchenko, Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov had a meeting with Nuland during the same period, and the US State Department persuaded him to withdraw his support for Yanukovych, threatening him with sanctions.[25][26] According to various estimates,[attribution needed] the businessman controlled about 40–60 deputies[clarification needed] of the Verkhovna Rada from the Party of Regions, and his TV channels began to cover the country's leadership critically during the Euromaidan period.[26]

Senator John McCain and Ambassador Jeffrey Pyatt meeting with opposition leaders, December 14, 2013

Republican Senator John McCain arrived in Kyiv on December 14.[27] The Arizona Senator wanted to lead the US diplomatic efforts to get Ukraine to sign an association agreement with the EU at the beginning of the protests, but Joe Biden and Victoria Nuland talked him out of the idea.[28] McCain met with Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara, opposition leaders,[27] Metropolitan Vladimir, Primate Filaret, and oligarchs who are still undecided whether to support Yanukovych or the opposition.[28] The next day, he was joined by Senator Chris Murphy.[27][29] Speaking to protesters on Maidan, McCain said: "We are here to support your just cause, the sovereign right of Ukraine to determine its own destiny freely and independently. And the destiny you seek lies in Europe."[29] McCain asked his aide Chris Brose, with whom he traveled to Ukraine, to find some appropriate lines of Ukrainian poetry to quote at the podium.[28] He picked up the line "Love your Ukraine, love her in cruel times, love her in cruel moments, pray to God for her" from Taras Shevchenko's poem "Shall we ever meet again?".[28] McCain recalled that the crowd's reaction exceeded his expectations.[28] Chris Murphy told those gathered in the square, "You are making history. If you are successful, the United States will stand with you every step of the way."[30] That evening, McCain and Murphy were invited to Yanukovych's presidential palace at around 8 p.m. that night.[28] The Ukrainian leader spoke for two hours about how he believed the West and the protesters had dealt unfairly with him.[28] The president also told the Americans that he offered to resume negotiations with the EU, but that the Europeans rejected his offer.[28] In the end, the senators told the Ukrainian president, "told him for the fifth or sixth time, the independence movement couldn’t be stopped. If he tried to stop it with more violence, he’d be swept out of power."[attribution needed][28] John McCain later recalled that "I’ve never been so damned inspired in my life," as after visiting the Maidan.[28]

After Euromaidan was repeatedly[clarification needed] visited by American and European politicians, the Russian State Duma passed a resolution accusing Western governments of "open interference...in the internal affairs of the sovereign Ukraine."[31]

January 2014[edit]

In early January 2014, the United States Senate passed a resolution (S.Res.319, "A resolution expressing support for the Ukrainian people in light of President Yanukovych’s decision not to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union") that outlined the possibility of personal sanctions against Ukrainian officials if the violence[ambiguous] continues.[21] On January 15, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on "Implications of the crisis in Ukraine" led by Robert Menendez and attended by Victoria Nuland, John McCain, Marco Rubio, Rand Paul, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, among others.[32] Brzezinski agreed with Nuland that Ukraine's integration with the West would force Russia down the same path.[clarification needed][33]

On January 22, 2014, the U.S. embassy in Ukraine announced that it had revoked the visas of several Ukrainian citizens whom the U.S. government considers guilty of using force against demonstrators last November 30. Their names were not announced, but they likely included Ukrainian Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko and Kyiv police chief Valeriy Karyak, who resigned in December.[34] A week later, the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs said it was ready to give the restrictions the force of law.[34]

On January 27, Joe Biden called Yanukovych and demanded that he take measures to stop the violence and said that a state of emergency should not be imposed in the country.[35] The U.S. envoy said that "no time should be lost," calling for the "pull back riot police" from the streets of Kyiv and to start working together with the opposition to resolve the crisis.[35] The next day, Yanukovych spoke with Biden again, and the U.S. vice president urged the Ukrainian head of state to "without delay" repeal the anti-protest laws.[36] On the same day, the laws aimed at combating the protests were repealed[neutrality is disputed] and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned.[37]

The U.S. administration supported the repeal of the "anti-democratic" Laws, and after the resignation of Mykola Azarov's government, said that the new cabinet should "promote political unity, economic recovery with the help of the International Monetary Fund, and act to fulfill the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for a European future."[34] In an interview from Moscow, Azarov said that Nuland had suggested he resign.[38]

Also on 27 January, activists of the Spilna Sprava organization briefly seized the building of the Ukrainian Justice Ministry.[39] A few days earlier, members of the movement also seized the buildings of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy, but, soon, they were released.[39] The Ukrainian Interior Ministry website then reported that Ambassador Jeffrey R. Pyatt had a telephone conversation with Vitaliy Zakharchenko and agreed to mediate negotiations for the release of the seized Justice Ministry building.[40] The article ended: "Law enforcement are grateful to Geoffrey R. Pyatt for his effective mediation in resolving difficult situations and count on the diplomat's further assistance".[40]

Nuland-Pyatt leak[edit]

On February 4, 2014, a recording of an intercepted conversation between Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Jeffrey R. Pyatt was published on YouTube, with the latter apparently speaking from a regular cell phone.[41] The recording showed that the Americans are much more involved in Ukraine than they may have publicly admitted, and that they have their own political agenda.[fact or opinion?][21] A 4-minute video with Russian subtitles titled "Maidan Puppets," posted on the anti-Maidan "RePost" account, included a fragment of a conversation between the two diplomats from January 28[42] in which they candidly shared their assessment of opposition leaders and the situation in Ukraine.[41] Among other things, they expressed the idea that Vitaliy Klitschko should not be included in the future government of the country, Tyahnybok and his "guys" represent a problem, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk is a good candidate for the future premiership; the ambassador also stated the importance of "kind of outreach to Yanukovych".[43] Nuland's "fuck the EU" remark became scandalous when the conversation turned to the possibility of involving the United Nations in a diplomatic settlement of the crisis in the country, while the European Union's position in the conflict seemed insufficiently active to the Americans.[43] Nuland told Payette that she had spoken that same day with former senior State Department official Jeffrey D. Feltman and the latter said that diplomat Robert Serry could be involved through the United Nations.[43] The recording ends with Nuland saying that a phone conversation between Yanukovych and Vice President Biden should be organized to keep pressure on the Ukrainian leader and that Biden could show himself to be "atta-boy".[44]

At first, the interception went unnoticed; Christopher Miller, editor-in-chief of the Kyiv Post, an English-language newspaper, recalled that when he received an e-mail with the video from an acquaintance in the Ukrainian security services, he initially thought it was a fake.[41] After listening to the recording a second time, the journalist decided to contact the American embassy for clarification, but the diplomats did not understand what they were talking about.[41]

American authorities did not deny the authenticity of the phone conversation[43] and tried to limit the reputational damage from the recording by shifting attention to Russia, which could have been behind the leak.[45] Thomas Sparrow said it only "helped fuel speculation about the role the US was playing in Ukraine and whether there were some hidden reasons behind its support for the opposition."[46] White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Nuland apologized to her European counterparts for the incorrect comments,[47] while German Chancellor Angela Merkel called Nuland's phrase "totally unacceptable."[48] Former U.S. presidential adviser on Russian affairs Toby T. Gati defended Nuland, saying that "Finally, the U.S. is using its leverage and getting involved [resolving the crisis]. It’s actually trying to make policy, that’s the good part."[49] U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul said in an interview that he had not seen any evidence that the leak was due to Russia.[50]

On Feb. 6, Nuland met with President Yanukovych to discuss future talks with opposition leaders,[47] and the next day at a briefing at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, she reacted to the release of the tape: "I'm not going to comment on private diplomatic conversations. But it was pretty impressive tradecraft. The audio was extremely clear." [51] The diplomat also called Putin aide Sergei Glazyev's words about the U.S. interfering in the protests "a complete fantasy," adding that "he could be a science fiction writer."[51] Glazyev claimed that the U.S. was spending $20 million a week on demonstrations, training and supplying weapons to rebels in Kyiv, thus violating the Budapest Memorandum, which prohibited interference in Ukraine's internal politics.[52]

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan wrote that the SBU could have been involved in the interception of diplomats, and the recording itself passed from hand to hand for a while until it was published online.[41] The Ukrainian agency denied its involvement in the wiretap, while it did not take any investigative action on the episode.[41] Researcher[vague] Robert Hunter alleges that "Nuland and Pyatt – whether acting on their own or on instructions from top-level US officials – were clearly seeking to draw Ukraine firmly into the US orbit."[53] Authors from the Center for American Progress suggested that by releasing the confidential conversation in the public domain, Russian intelligence agencies deprived themselves of access to a potentially valuable source of information.[54] Despite the costs, it was a higher priority for the Russians to confirm in public opinion the idea of American influence on the Ukrainian crisis.[54]

Already after Yanukovych's ouster, Secretary of State John Kerry said that the U.S. was doing what any country would do: protecting its interests.[46] As an example, he cited the relationship between Russia and the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.[46]

Culmination[edit]

"I made the last of many urgent calls to Yanukovych in late February of 2014, when his snipers were assassinating Ukrainian citizens by the dozens<...>I had been warning him for months to exercise restraint in dealing with his citizens, but on this night, three months into the demonstrations, I was telling him it was over; time for him to call off his gunmen and walk away<...>Yanukovych had lost the confidence of the Ukrainian people, I said, and he was going to be judged harshly by history if he kept killing them. The disgraced president fled Ukraine the next day."

Joe Biden, Promise Me, Dad[55]

On February 19, after the beginning of the acute phase of revolutionary events, President Obama, who was in Mexico, commented for the first time on the situation in Ukraine.[56] The U.S. leader condemned the violence in "the strongest terms" and said Washington would hold the Ukrainian government accountable if it went "over the line."[56] Back on January 28, Obama said that "in Ukraine, we stand for the principle that all people have the right to express themselves freely and peacefully, and have a say in their country’s future," although he did not mention specific individuals or events in that country.[57] According to the president's advisers, Obama remained silent for several months and waited until the critical moment when he saw signs of the final violent dispersal of the Maidan.[1] Following that, the American leader had an hour-long phone conversation with the Russian president.[1]

William Burns recalled that during the days of Yanukovych's overthrow, he was the head of the U.S. delegation with Michael McFaul in Sochi for the closing ceremony of the Olympic Games.[8] The diplomats sought a meeting with Putin, but he "but he was in no mood to talk."[8] Two days later, Burns arrived in Kyiv and, after visiting Maidan, told John Kerry that "Ukraine got it right."[8]

After Yanukovych's ouster, the U.S. administration held back public commentary on the outcome of the protests, as any triumphalism could only increase Russia's negative reaction.[58] However, even a week before the incident, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that "no beautiful phrase can conceal that there are attempts going on to build a sphere of influence [of the West in Ukraine]."[58]

Deputy Secretary William Burns honors the memory of victims of the tragic events in Ukraine. February 25, 2014

On the night of February 24, 2014, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, head of the SBU appointed by the new Ukrainian government, arrived at the headquarters of the service and found it completely empty: "It was empty. No lights. No leadership. Nobody was there."[59] He arrived at the office, from where he called the CIA station chief and the local head of MI6.[59] Around midnight, he met with them in the building, asking for support in rebuilding the Ukrainian intelligence service left behind by the overthrow of Yanukovych.[59]

On March 1, 2015, in an interview with Fareed Zakaria on CNN, Obama said that Yanukovych fled the country after "we had brokered a deal to transition power in Ukraine."[60] The next day, speaking in Beijing, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the U.S. president's words were "proof that from the very beginning, the United States was involved in the anti government coup that Obama neutrally described as a 'power transition'."[60] U.S. officials then clarified that Obama's words referred to the February 21, 2014 agreement.[60]

Persecution of Dmytro Firtash[edit]

On March 12, 2014, Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash, who had been under investigation by Washington since 2006, was arrested in Vienna at the request of the U.S. authorities.[38][61] After paying 125 million euros, the billionaire, who was described as a "patron" and "close confidant" of ousted President Yanukovych, was released on bail.[38] Federal prosecutors in Chicago filed charges that the businessman and his associates paid $18.5 million in bribes to Indian officials to secure access to a titanium mining deal that ultimately failed to materialize.[61] Prosecutors alleged Firtash funneled some of the payments through U.S. banks, allowing prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.[62] The billionaire's lawyers argued that the case was politically motivated and related to the redistribution of influence during the Ukraine crisis.[38]

The Americans' initial request for Firtash's arrest was sent back in late October 2013; shortly before that, President Yanukovych met with Putin in Sochi and the Russian president suggested that he would not sign the EU agreement.[38] On November 4, Yanukovych met with Victoria Nuland in Kyiv and assured her that his country was ready to sign the trade agreement.[38] The day before the meeting, several U.S. officials sent letters to Austria asking them to cancel Firtash's arrest, one of which was from the FBI's legal attaché in Vienna.[38] The arrest warrant was withdrawn, among other things, at the request of the U.S. State Department.[38] Four days after Yanukovych fled Ukraine, the U.S. request to Vienna was renewed.[63]

In April 2015, an Austrian court agreed with the lawyers, rejecting Washington's extradition request.[61] The defense's arguments were that the U.S. State Department directed the prosecution of Firtash to secure American interests and punish the billionaire for his ties to Yanukovych and Russia.[61] During the 12-hour hearing in court, Firtash said, "I have my views on how Ukraine should develop, and they are different from those" Amrican administration.[64] According to the tycoon's lawyer Dieter Boehmdorfer (former Austrian justice minister), the Washington wants to remove his client from Ukrainian politics because they believe he is pro-Russian – American prosecutors have denied such a link.[64] Defense attorneys linked the prosecution of the tycoon to Victoria Nuland's visits and departures to Ukraine.[65]

Judge Christoph Bauer found that the oligarch's prosecution was "at least partially politically motivated" and that Washington had not provided sufficient evidence.[66][67] The judge concluded that U.S. authorities sought Firtash's arrest during a "power vacuum" in Ukraine in 2014 related to the standoff with Russia; "Was it coincidence? Probably not."[64] Bauer called the "strange" actions of the U.S. justice system as proof of the version of political persecution by Washington: "On October 30, 2013, Austria first received a warrant for Firtash's arrest. But already on November 4, the warrant was suddenly withdrawn without any clear explanation of the reasons".[68] The judge said that the revocation of the arrest warrant could be related to the results of the meeting between Nuland and Yanukovych, during which the Ukrainian president promised the US diplomat to sign an association agreement with the EU, to release former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko for medical treatment and to give the US company Chevron the right to develop gas fields in Kharkiv Oblast.[68] The Austrian court also doubted the existence as such of a secret witness on the part of the U.S. Justice Department, which the U.S. side refused to provide.[67] Bauer summarized that "America obviously saw Firtash as somebody who was threatening their economic interests."[61]

Firtash denied that he was a conduit for Moscow's interests, although he was skeptical about signing the association agreement.[38] The Guardian columnist Sean Walker writes that "the timing of US moves against Firtash align intriguingly with political developments in Ukraine."[38] According to former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, "Firtash depended on Russia; the Americans were worried he could jump across to the Russian side because of his financial links."[38] British journalist Andrew Cockburn wrote that the threat of putting his sponsor "behind bars" was a powerful leverage on Yanukovych.[63]

U.S. democracy promotion[edit]

The New York Times journalist Peter Baker wrote that Obama sympathized with the pro-Western protesters who overthrew President Yanukovych, but he did not make global democracy promotion a leitmotif of his presidency.[1][relevant?] As an example, Baker points out that Tom Malinowski, Obama's nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy back in July 2013, was not confirmed by the Senate for months.[1][relevant?] The U.S. leader believed[attribution needed] that too much public support for the protests in Ukraine could cause a backlash, but the strategic goal of democratic transition was not off the table – the methods of achieving it were changing.[1] Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes argued that "democratic movements will be more sustainable if they are seen as not an extension of America or any other country, but coming from within these societies."[1] He said that "For the longer term, it is better to let the people within the country be the strongest voice while also ensuring that at the appropriate times you are weighing in publicly and privately."[1] Paula Dobriansky criticized Obama's lack of active role in the revolutionary events: "The administration’s Ukraine policy is emblematic of a broader problem with today’s foreign policy — absence of a strategic vision, disinterest in democracy promotion and an unwillingness to lead."[1]

U.S. administrations are known to have spent between $3.6 billion and $5 billion since Ukraine's independence in 1991 to promote the country's democratic transition,[relevant?] though aid has gradually declined over the years, totaling just over $100 million annually in 2012 and 2013.[69] USAID mentioned in its strategy the provision of donor assistance to the Verkhovna Rada, especially in the areas of policy making and legislative reform, as well as to political parties and election observers.[69] At the same time, back in early 2012, former Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer told the senate that Ukraine was "barely registers on the radar," and Ukrainian officials had been trying unsuccessfully for a year and a half to organize a meeting with President Obama or Vice President Biden.[70]

On December 13, 2013, speaking at a conference of the US-Ukraine Foundation in Washington, Nuland said that since 1991 the United States had supported the development of democratic skills and institutions in Ukraine and had invested more than 5 billion dollars in the country for this purpose.[71] In April 2014, Nuland specified that these 5 billion were spent to "supporting the aspirations of the Ukrainian people to have a strong, democratic government that represents their interests," but the Americans "certainly didn't spend any money supporting the Maidan," which was a "spontaneous movement."[72]

While Americans may view their democracy promotion programs as an acceptable policy, U.S. opponents[who?] see such actions as covert and illegal interference by Washington.[73] Vyacheslav Nikonov, a member of the Russian parliament, said "promote democracy" on which the U.S. government has spent money "is oftentimes a code word for regime change."[72] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev alleged that the $5 billion was spent to organize the overthrow of Yanukovych.[31] Political scientist Stephen Walt called Nuland "a leading proponent of U.S.-sponsored regime change," saying such efforts are an example of "softer policy instruments to promote or solidify democratic change in other countries" that the U.S. has used, as opposed to direct military campaigns against Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.[74] Researcher Kent DeBenedictts argues that the original context and meaning of the statement has been lost, giving Russian officials an excuse to assess Nuland's words as an admission to funding the Maidan protests.[31]

Jeffrey Mankoff, deputy director of the Russian and Euro-Asian programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that although organizations such as the National Democratic Institute or the International Republican Institute can provide assistance to anyone who approaches them and that their goal is the democratic development of the country, in practice it is about supporting the opposition, and "in this sense, I quite understand the concerns of the Russian and Ukrainian authorities".[34] The director of the International Republican Institute in Ukraine, Chris Holzen, reported that at training seminars organized by the institute's structures, up to 20 percent of the attendees were Party of Regions functionaries.[34] Members of the Communist Party of Ukraine were regularly sent invitations to the events, but they refused to interact with the Americans (except for branches in Kharkiv Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).[34]

On February 11, 2014, a two-minute video "I Am a Ukrainian" starring Euromaidan activist Yulia Marushevska was published on YouTube.[75] The video was directed by American filmmaker Ben Moses and published on the channel of the full-length movie "A Whisper to a Roar" by the same Moses.[relevant?] In January 2013, "A Whisper to a Roar" was screened at the State Department, and Hillary Clinton said the film was "an inspiration to people around the world who are committed to making governments accountable to citizens."[76] Larry Diamond, a senior adviser to the National Endowment for Democracy, served as the tape's executive director.[77][relevant?]

The Ukrainian TV channel Hromadske, which started its work on November 22, 2013, and covered the Maidan protests almost around the clock, received a grant from the US Embassy in Ukraine to buy equipment;[relevant?] it also received money from the International Renaissance Foundation, founded by US billionaire George Soros.[78] In an article written for Open Society Foundations, Mustafa Nayyem, editor-in-chief of Hromadske, noted the importance of non-governmental media in covering the Revolution.[79]

Financial Times claimed that the civil society organization New Citizen, headed by Oleh Rybachuk, had "played a big role in getting the protest up and running".[80] Among other things, Rybachuk served as Yushchenko's campaign chief during the 2004 presidential elections that led to the Orange Revolution.[relevant?][81] In a 2012 interview, he said, "The Orange Revolution was a miracle, a massive peaceful protest that worked. We want to do that again and we think we will."[81] PandoDaily published an investigation in February 2014, based on Marcy Wheeler's allegation that Rybachuk's organizations New Citizen, Center UA, Chesno, and Stop Censorship were funded by USAID through American philanthropist Pierre Omidyar.[82][83] At the same time, according to Rybachuk, New Citizen did not receive Western grants.[80] According to the article's author Mark Ames, "Omidyar working hand-in-glove with U.S. foreign policy agencies to interfere in foreign governments, co-financing regime change with well-known arms of the American Empire."[84]

TechCamp activities in Ukraine[edit]

In 2010, as part of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Civil Society 2.0 initiative, the U.S. State Department's Office of Digital Diplomacy launched the TechCamps project to "builds the digital literacy of civil society organizations around the world."[85] Clinton was known for her embrace of the World Wide Web as a tool for freedom and democratization, which was to become a component of Washington's foreign policy in promoting American interests and values.[86] The TechCamps program was designed "to help civil society activists make full use of social media and other technological resources" and was conducted in locations around the world, from Almaty and London to Zanzibar and Taipei.[87] Researchers called TechCamps one of the most effective U.S. digital diplomacy projects.[86] According to Christopher Smith, an American diplomat who worked in Ukraine, the fate of the TechCamps program in Ukraine "a harbinger of things to come".[clarification needed][87] Аt the same time, he said, the work of the program became an object of propaganda designed to prove the involvement of the United States in the events of Maidan.[87]

On September 12–13, 2012, the first TechCamp under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine was held in Kyiv with about a dozen U.S. instructors.[88][89] The event was attended by U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine John F. Tefft and State Department Senior Advisor for Innovation Alec Ross.[90] Among others, the conference was prepared by Katie Dowd,[91] who later became Hillary Clinton's digital director during her 2016 campaign.[92] The tech camp was led by IT specialist and deputy press officer at the Embassy, Luke Schtele.[93] Christopher Smith wrote that, along with his partner Ben, they "were a lot of fun — consistently upbeat, great with mixology and parties, and willing to tolerate old married people."[87] Between 2012 and 2014, Stehle trained more than 350 activists and journalists nationwide in the use of digital technology.[93][excessive detail?]

The official press release stated, "TechCamp Kyiv is a two days conference where civil society organizations share current challenges they are facing with peers and technologists and brainstorm how technology can play a role in addressing these challenges. Over 100 highly motivated participants will attend from throughout Ukraine and Belarus. This interactive event will bring together American, Ukrainian, and Belarusian technology experts working with educators, NGO staff and social media enthusiasts to find effective, low-cost ways to address real social problems by using technology."[89] The U.S. Embassy also invited representatives of the Ukrainian government to the event "to pre-empt any misunderstandings about the program or its goals."[excessive detail?][88]

Anti-American leaflet in Donetsk: “Arab Revolution in Donetsk?”

TechCamp Kyiv 2.0 was held on March 1, 2013, at Microsoft's headquarters in Ukraine[85] and was attended by about 60 people.[88] On April 4, 2013, a regional tech camp was held in Donetsk on the territory of the art space "Izolyatsia" and was also attended by U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine John F. Tefft.[excessive detail?][88] After the diplomat's departure, the venue was surrounded by a crowd of about 100–150 people with placards reading "No Arab Spring in Ukraine" and "TechCamp = Revolution".[88] When the protesters got inside the Isolation, they seized educational materials they could find, as well as videotaping the event and its participants.[94] Luke Stehle, who was there, barricaded himself in the bathroom, sending messages to the Embassy in Kyiv asking for help.[94] An hour later, a squad of police arrived on the scene and allowed the protesters to retreat.[94] After the incident, John F. Tefft sent a letter to the governor of Donetsk and the Ukrainian interior minister asking for an investigation, but to no avail.[94] The second regional technical camp was held in Ivano-Frankivsk at the site of the National Technical University of Oil and Gas.[94] However, the event was disrupted due to reports of a bomb planted in the building, and the Ukrainians participating in the event were interrogated by the SBU.[94] In May and June 2013, Ukrainian and Russian television broadcast documentaries claiming that TechCamps were created to prepare a colour revolution.[95]

On November 14–15, 2013, the last technical camp was held.[96][89] Christopher Smith states that "because the Embassy expected trouble, most preparatory work was done quietly," although about 100 young Ukrainians did show up for the event.[96] For security reasons, the event was planned to be held at the "Old Marine House," a U.S. government-owned building with several staff apartments.[97] Before the event, participants received fake letters allegedly from the U.S. Embassy informing them that Techcamp was canceled.[97] They also received numerous calls on their cell phones, and when they picked up the phone, they heard Soviet war songs coming from the speaker.[97] Because of the attempts to disrupt Techcamp, it was decided to move it directly to the American Embassy, and even the bus drivers who were supposed to transport the participants from the hotel did not know about the move until the last moment.[excessive detail?][97]

On 20 November 2013, a member of the Verkhovna Rada from the Party of Regions, Oleh Tsaryov, accused Techcamps of "staging civil war in Ukraine", saying that the last Techcamp was held on 14–15 November.[89] According to him, the project is under the patronage of the US ambassador to Kyiv, Geoffrey R. Pyatt, with the aim of training specialists in media work and organizing protests and overthrowing the current regime similar to the events of the Arab Spring.[98] The parliamentarian called on law enforcement agencies to find out whether the program's activities constitute interference in Ukraine's affairs.[98] Tsaryov also claimed that the opposition's activities were directed by an American, Brian Fink, who moved between the offices of the UDAR and Batkivshchyna parties and the US Embassy.[99]

Assessments[edit]

Former acting CIA director Michael Morell rejects the Obama administration's involvement[neutrality is disputed] in the leadership change in Ukraine: "Russian president Putin believes that the United States was behind the protests in the streets of Kyiv that began the Russia-Ukraine crisis. That is not true."[100] U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 1998 to 2000 Steven Pifer stated that "were the CIA half as effective as [Putin] seems to think, we’d run the world. But the ability, for example, in the Maidan revolution, at one point there were estimates of 300,000 to 700,000 people on the streets of Kyiv, a city of less than 3 million. You don’t organize that from outside."[101]

At the end of 2014 Russian newspaper Kommersant published an interview with the head of the US private intelligence and analytical organization Stratfor, George Friedman, where, according to Kommersant, he said that the events of early 2014 were "the most blatant coup in history". [102] He later said that he had been misrepresented by Sputnik and that what he actually said was: "If this was a coup, it was the most blatant coup in history, since the Americans were quite open in supporting the demonstrators."[103] In the Kommersant article he said, "The United States was interested in forming a pro-Western government in Ukraine. They saw that Russia is on the rise, and sought to prevent it from consolidating its positions in the post-Soviet space. The success of the pro-Western forces in Ukraine would deter Russia."[102] Friedman summarized that American and Russian interests regarding Ukraine are incompatible.[102] Academic researchers note that it's Russian propaganda which characterizes Euromaidan as a coup, and the actual military coup was performed by Russia in Ukrainian Crimea on the 27th February 2014, when Russian military seized Crimean parliament and government buildings and replaced Ukrainian elected officials with Russian-controlled figures.[104][105][106]

Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute wrote that "The extent of the Obama administration’s meddling in Ukraine’s politics was breathtaking." and "it was a grotesque distortion to portray the events in Ukraine as a purely indigenous, popular uprising."[107] In February 2023, former President Donald Trump stated that "for decades, we've had the very same people, such as Victoria Nuland and many others just like her obsessed with pushing Ukraine toward NATO, not to mention the State Department support for uprisings in Ukraine."[108]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

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Works cited[edit]

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